Imagery and the Coherence of Imagination: A Critique of White
Nigel J.T. Thomas
Page 5
Source: http://www.imagery-imagination.com/white.htm
4. Imagery in imagining.
White's converse claim, that 'imagination does not imply imagery' (pp. 88, 91), is clearly right: we sometimes speak of imagination, or imagining something, in cases where there seems to be no necessity for imagery to be involved. It is widely agreed, and seemingly beyond question, that if we imagine that something is the case - for instance 'that the black horse is here now or not there then' (p. 90) - then we need not form any imagery. Although we often may form an image of some circumstance that we imagine to be the case (e.g. I may 'see' a black horse here with me now in my office, or visualize some scene from memory without a black horse, perhaps when there really was one), the imaging is incidental, and does not amount to imagining that it is so. Pace Wittgenstein (1967 §69), I can imagine (i.e. visualize) my dog Rusty in the back garden, but I cannot thereby imagine that Rusty is in the back garden, for Rusty is, alas, long dead.
However, I contend that, apart from cases of 'imagining that' (and noting that the 'that' is often left implicit), all imagining does involve imagery (or seeing-as) in an essential way. White tries to argue otherwise, but none of his examples stand up. Imagining mowing the lawn, for example (p. 88), might possibly be thinking idly that I might mow the lawn, but a less strained interpretation would be having imagery (no doubt multi- modal, including kinaesthetic - what psychologists call enactive imagery) resembling the experience of carrying out that chore. Likewise, imagining a difficulty or objection (pp. 88-9) might either be imagining that a (perhaps unspecified) difficulty or objection might arise, or it might be imagining, in the sense of vicariously experiencing, imaging, the actual circumstance of a particular difficulty arising or a particular objection being made (we might 'hear' it being put to us, perhaps in our own voice if we have no specific objector in mind).
Similarly, it seems to me simply false that imagining 'how a problem could or would be solved' (p. 90) is possible without imagery of some kind, especially when we remember that 'inner speech' is itself a form of imagery (auditory and/or vocal- kinaesthetic) (Paivio, 1971; 1986; Reisberg, 1992). If I think of how Köhler's (1927) apes managed to get at their coveted bananas I have imagery of chimpanzees piling up boxes, reaching between cage bars with sticks, and so forth. What is more, if I were trying to solve this type of problem, if it were of any difficulty, I would try to think it through in imagery myself. Certainly there is evidence that people often, I do not say always, rely on imagery in solving many sorts of problem (e.g. Kaufmann 1980; Miller, 1984; Finke, Ward & Smith, 1992). This is true even in such abstract domains as logic and arithmetic (e.g. Clement and Falmange, 1986; Hayes, 1973). White might say that to have such imagery is not in itself to solve or be attempting to solve the problem, just as diagrams showing how to solve a problem do not in themselves constitute a solution unless they are understood. But this again relies on the already rejected assumption that mental images are, like physical pictures, inert, inherently meaningless objects, requiring imaginative interpretation.
Admittedly, the actual mental process of solving a problem (as opposed to imagining how it might be solved) need not necessarily involve either imagery or any imageable actions. The answer may 'just come'. However, inasmuch as we can imagine solving a problem this way (as opposed to imagining that it was, or might be, solved this way) that surely will involve imagery (perhaps something like imagery of darkness and silence inside our head, and then the solution popping into it as a verbal or a visual image). Anything less would hardly amount to imagining.
If what I have suggested about the nature of imagery is on the right track then, even in some examples where actual imaging does not seem likely to be involved, something closely related to it probably is. 'The persecution of the paranoiac,' White rightly tells us, 'is as much a figment of his imagination as Macbeth's dagger is of his,' (p. 89), the point being that the former is 'non-sensory' and therefore cannot be imaged. However, the relevance of imagination here undoubtedly goes beyond the fact that the paranoiac imagines that he is being persecuted. To be sure, paranoia is probably not essentially a matter of having certain pictures in one's head (although hallucinations may be involved), but neither is it merely a matter of entertaining certain propositions. Much more plausibly, it may be construed as a disorder of intentional perception, of perceiving-as. The paranoiac over-interprets (in a particular biased way) his perceptual input, and sees little or nothing as something bad. He hears an innocent remark as a threat, sees a smile as mockery, and sees a shadow in the alley as a lurking spy. A plausible rationale for why the paranoiac's delusions are called imaginary would thus be that, like ordinary imagery, they involve the mechanisms of perceiving-as operating in a non-veridical manner. (Of course, what makes the paranoiac insane is not the fact that he imagines things - we all do that - but that he does not recognize the non-veridicality of his imaginings.)
§5. Supposing and imagining that.
But what are we to make of the very common construction 'imagine that p'? After all, the proposition p may describe a quite unvisualizeable (or otherwise unimageable) circumstance. 'I am inclined to imagine that Fermat's last theorem is true,' or 'Imagine that all men have red hair,' (p. 90) seem to be perfectly acceptable sentences, but neither circumstance can be imaged. Indeed, 'Image (or visualize) that p,' does not seem to make sense at all. I can visualize a black horse here, now, and I can imagine that a black horse is here, now, but I cannot visualize that a black horse is here, now. It is these types of uses of 'imagine', surely, which so many recent philosophers have taken to be essentially synonymous with 'suppose', 'believe' or 'pretend'. Since they generally continue to hold (rightly, I have argued) that 'to imagine' sometimes canmean 'to image', they conclude that 'imagine' must have multiple meanings. But White rejects this line, and here I think his analysis is on track. The proposed alternative senses do not fit. I will consider White's discussion of 'suppose', which is the most important case, and the one which he treats most fully, but similar remarks would apply to the other alleged synonyms.
Even White admits that 'suppose' and 'imagine' are 'often both applicable in the same case . . . as when one either imagines or supposes that one is being followed, or is asked either to imagine or suppose that one is alone on a desert island' (p. 139), but he vehemently rejects the suggestion that there is a sense of 'imagine' which is equivalent, or closely similar, to 'suppose'. (He seems to regard this, and the other suggested synonyms, as a stratagem designed simply to neutralize counter-examples to the linkage of imagining and imaging (p. 85), to set them aside as special cases.) Certainly imagining and supposing are not always equivalent; for example, one may go along with a supposition, but not an imagination (p. 136). But White argues persuasively that even in contexts where either word seems to fit they nevertheless have different implications (p. 139). Although 'imagine' and 'suppose' may be inter- substitutable, their 'center of gravity' remains different, they give different scope for continuation: I suppose there is a cat in my room and I try to find it; I imagine there is a cat there, and then I imagine it under the bed, green eyes glowing (c.f. p. 139). If we are told that Philip Marlowe, going down some mean street, supposed that someone was following him, the story might continue with a description of how he attempted to shake off the unseen pursuer. If we were told that he imagined that someone was following him the continuation might be similar, but it might instead be that he persuaded himself that it was nothing but a delusion induced by long days of sleeplessness and fear. The latter would not appropriately follow 'supposed'. Unlike 'imagined', 'supposed' seems necessarily to carry the implication that something is taken, at least for the sake of argument, as true. If we believe that someone is supposing something, we will expect them to take or be ready to take appropriate actions or to draw appropriate inferences, but we may have no such expectations if we believe that they are merely imagining something. As White has it: The real difference is that to say 'Suppose that p' invites a statement of the consequences or implications of p, whereas to say 'Imagine that p' sets the stage for various kinds of embroidery. Thus, on the one hand, we commonly say 'Suppose (supposing) that p, what then?' but not 'Imagine (much less 'imagining') that p, what then?'. On the other hand we commonly say 'I want you all to sit back and imagine for the next few minutes that you are marooned on a desert island', but not, 'I want you to all sit back and suppose . . .'. We are inviting our audience to give free rein to their imagination but not to their supposition. (p. 141-2, White's ellipsis).
I am much inclined to think that this is right, that White has uncovered an important and widespread error here, and that, indeed, 'there is no sense of "imagine" in which it is equivalent to "suppose"' (p. 135). However, in showing this White may have opened the door again to imagery. Much of the 'embroidery' he mentions is surely likely to be a matter of imaging. What I would do if asked to sit back and imagine being marooned on a desert island would be to try to 'feel' the sand beneath my feet, the heat of the sun, and the fear and hunger in the pit of my stomach, to 'see' the palm trees and the empty horizon, and 'hear' the crashing of the waves on the reef. Perhaps I would also imagine what I might try to do - build a shelter, a signal fire, catch fish or shake down coconuts. But if I just considered the notion of these activities without trying to some degree to vicariously experience them, then that would hardly be imagining anything; I would just be thinking of consequences and implications, of what I would do supposing I were marooned on a desert island. To imagine that all men have red hair is not merely to suppose it, to acknowledge the proposition's truth, or, at least, to provisionally grant it (perhaps for the sake of some syllogistic exercise). Rather it is to 'embroider' the supposition with imagery, such as of crowds of redheads, our brunette friends with red hair, and so on. Marlowe's imagining that he is being followed certainly need not involve such out and out imaging ('seeing' his pursuer in his 'mind's eye'), but it might well involve his 'embroidering' his perceptions by, for example, hearing vague noises behind him as stealthy footsteps. At the least it would imply his being on the alert for such sensory 'evidence', being ready and inclined thus to 'embroider'. Conversely, he might suppose someone to be following him - he knows they need to keep track of his whereabouts - without at all trying to detect their actual presence - he is convinced that they are there but knows they are much too skillful to give themselves away.
'Imagining that', therefore, is not equivalent to 'supposing that'. To be sure, one cannot image, or visualize, that p, but to imagine that p does seem in many, and perhaps the paradigmatic, cases to be to produce p-relevant imagery, or to relevantly perceive-as.
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